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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT V. LOVELESS 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
JEANNE MCNEIL LOVELESS 
Defendant and 
Apellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
JEANNE MCNIEL LOVELESS 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to award 
Defendant/Appellant an interest in the marital home? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing 
to award Defendant/Appellant a reasonable portion of the 
value increase of the marital home during the marriage? 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that the marital 
home was Plaintiff/Appellee1s separate property? 
4. Did the trial court err in allowing the testimony 
of an expert setting the value of the property at the time of 
separation instead of the time of divorce? 
5. Did the trial court err in fixing the value of the 
Appellate No. 970184-CA 
Priority No. 16 
marital property as of the time of separation rather than the 
time of divorce? 
6. Did the trial court err in awarding 
Plaintiff/Appellee a judgment for debts incurred after 
separation for Christmas gifts for his family and children? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final Order of Judgment of the 
Fourth District Court in the above-entitled domestic matter 
distributing the assets and debts of the parties herein. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
On September 3, and 18, 1996, the above-entitled matter 
came before the trial court for trial on the issues of the 
distribution of assets and debts of the parties. Evidence 
was presented at trial by way of testimony. Counsel for 
Defendant objected at trial and by way of a Motion in Limine 
(R. at 227) to the use of the separation date to determine 
the value of the marital real property and to the use of a 
cost analysis to determine the value of the marital real 
property, which objections were overruled by the trial court. 
Final arguments were submitted to the trial court in writing 
(R. at 285) and the trial court entered its Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law and Final Order of Judgment (R. at 
350) awarding Plaintiff the marital real property free of any 
interest of Defendant yet requiring Defendant to pay marital 
debt. Defendant has appealed said Final Order of Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties were married on March 11, 1994. At the 
time of marriage Plaintiff (hereinafter Brent Loveless) owned 
a home and real property in Payson City, Utah, owned a 
retirement program through his employment, and owned an 
insurance annuity. 
2. After the marriage Defendant (hereinafter Jeanne) 
contributed furniture and other items to a garage sale for 
the purpose of obtaining funds to improve the basement in the 
home. (R. at 417-451) 
3. Jeanne further contributed to the improvement of 
the home by paying her son to install plumbing in said 
basement. (R. at 440) . 
4. Jeanne further contributed by painting and helping 
with other work in improving said basement, as well as doing 
a large portion of the domestic chores for Brent Loveless and 
his children. (R. at 417-451). 
5. Jeanne used her wages to purchase food, pay the 
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children allowances, gifts, entertainment, and to purchase 
items for the home such as blinds and decorations. (R. at 
417-451) 
6. Brent Loveless used his wages to pay the Mortgage 
on the home in the amount of $21,382.00, contribute to his 
retirement in the amount of $1,460.00, and contribute to his 
insurance annuity in the amount of $1,600.00. (R. at 340) 
7. During the marriage the parties filed joint tax 
returns wherein Brent Loveless claimed Jeanne and her 
daughter as dependants. (Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 1 & 2) . 
8. A large portion of the credit card debt incurred by 
Brent Loveless prior to the Divorce and after separation was 
to purchase Christmas gifts for his children and family. (R. 
at 322) . 
9. Brent Loveless entered the marriage with credit 
card debt of approximately $1,300.00. (R. at 384). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find that the real 
property owned by Brent Loveless prior to the marriage 
changed character to marital property based upon the payment 
of over $21,000.00 of the mortgage with marital funds, as 
well as Jeanne's other contributions to maintain and enhance 
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the property. 
The trial court further erred in fixing the value of 
said property as of the date of separation rather than the 
date of divorce, and for accepting expert testimony valuing 
the property at the time of separation. 
The trial court further erred by ordering Jeanne to pay 
one-half (1/2) of the debt incurred by Brent Loveless, 
including a $1,300.00 debt he brought into the marriage and 
$2,400.00 incurred after separation for groceries and 
Christmas gifts for his children. 
The serious inconsistencies of trial court indicate a 
prejudice and abuse of discretion which requires the 
Appellate Court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on all issues of fact and law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD 
JEANNE ONE-HALF OF THE VALUE THAT THE 
MARITAL HOME INCREASED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
During the course of the marriage, Brent Loveless used 
marital funds (his wages) to pay $21,382.00 toward the 
mortgage on the marital residence. During the course of the 
marriage the value of the home increase from $98,000.00 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17) to $143,000.00. (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 32). Said increase was due to an increase in the 
market as well as the finishing of living space in the 
basement. 
Although the trial court has discretion in awarding 
property which is marital, separate or even inherited in 
divorce proceedings, (see e.g. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 
1169(Ut. App. 1990)) the Utah courts have generally 
recognized that even separate property can lose its "separate 
character" and become marital property. Schaumberg v. 
Schaumbera, 875 P.2d 598 (Ut. App. 1994). In Schaumberg, 
Husband had purchased real property with inherited funds. 
Husband then used marital funds to make the payments on said 
property as well as make some improvements. Wife did not 
work and contributed no monies directly to the property. The 
Utah Court of Appeals found that the property had changed its 
character from a separate asset to a marital asset and ruled 
that Wife was entitled to one-half of the appreciation of the 
property after its purchase and not including the inherited 
funds used for said purchase. Id. at 603. 
In the case before the Court, there is no dispute that 
the real property was separate prior to the marriage. As in 
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Schaumberg, thereafter Brent Loveless used marital funds to 
both maintain and improve said property. Moreover, Jeanne 
made contributions toward said property not made by the 
"Wife" in Schaumberg, including but not limited to money, 
furniture, decorations, and personal work. Further, as in 
Schaumberg, Brent Loveless asserted that all loans and debts, 
even those incurred in improving the house, were marital and 
requested that Jeanne pay one-half of said debts. (See e.g. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24) (R. at 214) (R. at 383). It seems 
clear that under the Court's analysis in Schaumberg, Jeanne 
would be entitled to one-half (1/2) of the appreciation of 
the marital real property during the marriage. 
While this Court in Schaumberg awarded Wife a one-half 
(1/2) interest with no monetary contribution to the property 
on her part, the Utah Supreme Court has also made it clear 
that a sizable contribution is unnecessary to entitle a 
spouse to a full share of a property's value. In the case of 
Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982) Wife contributed 
only a small portion towards the purchase and maintenance of 
property more or less inherited by Husband, yet she received 
a full share of its value upon divorce. 
It should be pointed out that there are cases which 
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Brent Loveless claims appear to be in conflict with those 
cited above. In the case of Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133 
(Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court named several factors to 
be considered in determining whether premarital property, 
gifts and inheritances should be viewed as separate or 
marital property. Among them are the amount and kind of 
property to be divided; whether the property was acquired 
before or during the marriage; the source of the property; 
the health of the parties; the parties' standard of living, 
respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; 
the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; 
the parties' ages at the time of marriage and of divorce; 
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support to be awarded. 
The Court in Burke stated that ff[o]f particular concern 
. . . is whether one spouse has made any contribution toward 
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse (citing 
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1987)), and 
whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties, (citing Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 
705, 706 (Utah 1982)). The Court went on to find that 
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Husband had done nothing to contribute to or enhance the 
value of the property inherited by Wife and was, therefore, 
not entitled to share in its value. 
Closer examination shows that Burke is actually 
consistent with both Schaumberg and Workman. In Burke, Wife 
inherited the subject property without any debt or liens 
thereon. No payments were made with marital property to 
either maintain or enhance the property and, therefore, the 
property failed to change character from separate to marital 
property. 
In the case before the Court, Jeanne made numerous 
contributions to the maintenance and enhancement of the 
property, not to mention the payment of over $21,000.00 
toward the debt on said property. As in Schaumberg, the fact 
that said payments were made with Brent Loveless' wages is 
irrelevant. Said monies were a marital asset when used to 
make the house payment just as they were a marital asset when 
used to contribute to Brent Loveless' retirement and 
insurance annuity, both of which, Brent Loveless agreed and 
the trial court ordered, Jeanne was entitled to a one-half 
(1/2) interest. 
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It should also be pointed out that the trial court 
failed to follow the analysis set forth in Burke in depriving 
Jeanne of an interest in the marital home. The trial court 
did find that Jeanne did make contributions to both the 
marriage and the property including over $21,000.00 in 
marital income. (R. at 328) . The trial court, however, 
claimed this was not significant because a large portion of 
the house payment went toward interest. The fact that a 
portion of mortgage payments goes to interest as well as 
principal is irrelevant. The payment of over $21,000.00 was 
required to "maintain and enhance" the value of the property 
or it would have been lost. Moreover, such an amount can 
hardly be considered insignificant. 
The trial court further attached significance to the 
fact that a good deal of the property's increased value was 
due to appreciation rather than the improvement thereto. The 
case law is clear, however, that when the property changes 
character it becomes marital property and the parties must 
divide all of the increased value including appreciation. 
The method of division used by the trial court herein is 
without precedent and unsupported in fact or law. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING THE VALUE 
OF THE MARITAL, REAL PROPERTY AT THE TIME 
OF SEPARATION AND THE VALUE THEREOF SHOULD 
BE FIXED AS OF THE DATE OF DIVORCE. 
The trial court found that because the marriage had 
deteriorated to the point that Jeanne was looking for an 
apartment to live in back in June of 1995, but could not find 
one, the marriage was essentially over at the time of 
separation, in December of 1995, and the value of the real 
property should be set as of that date. (R. at 328). Such a 
holding is completely contrary to current Utah statute and to 
current case law. 
In the matter of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1980) , one of the parties purchased a home not only 
subsequent to separation but subsequent to the filing of the 
divorce action. In rejecting said party's attempt to protect 
the equity accumulated prior to the time of divorce the Utah 
Supreme Court held unequivocally that "[t]he marital estate 
is evaluated according to the existing property interests at 
the time the marriage is terminated by the decree of 
divorce". Id. at 1222. The Court further stated that "such 
an argument is contrary to the specific provisions of Section 
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30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, and the rulings of this court in 
accordance therewith". Id. 
After citing to Fletcher, above, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated said rule of law in the case of Beraer v. Beraer, 
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), wherein the Court ruled that an 
expert's opinion was inconclusive as to the valuation of 
marital property because it was not valued at the time of 
divorce. The only exception to the above rules is in a case 
where "one party has dissipated and asset, hidden its value, 
or otherwise acted obstructively". Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 
1050, 1052 (Ut. App. 1987). There have never been any 
allegations in the case presently before the Court that any 
of the above exceptions are applicable, nor were there any 
findings of such. 
The trial court in the present case has clearly erred 
first, by affixing the value of the marital real property as 
of the date of separation, rather than the date of divorce as 
required by law, and second, by accepting the evidence of 
Brent Loveless' expert regarding the value of the marital 
property at $137,000.00 as of the date of separation rather 
than the evidence of Jeanne's expert which fixed the value of 
the property at $143,000.00 at the time of divorce. Based 
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upon the value of the property at the time of marriage of 
$98,000.00, Jeanne is entitled to an equitable distribution 
of one-half (1/2) of the $45,000.00 increase therein. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING JEANNE 
TO PAY ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE DEBT BRENT 
LOVELESS INCURRED AFTER SEPARATION TO 
PURCHASE CHRISTMAS GIFTS FOR HIS FAMILY. 
After separation, Brent Loveless ran his personal 
Mastercard bill up from $1,334.00 to $3,716.00 for what he 
admitted to be groceries and Christmas gifts. (R. at 322). 
Moreover, Brent Loveless entered the marriage with a debt on 
his Mastercard of approximately $1,300.00.(R. at 384). Brent 
Loveless continued to maintain a high balance on his 
Mastercard until the time of divorce, and the trial court 
somehow found that Jeanne was responsible for one-half of 
said amount. The trial court did not, however, suggest that 
Brent Loveless be responsible for paying any of Jeanne's post 
separation debt. Although the original debt had long been 
paid off by the time of divorce herein, any amount awarded to 
Brent Loveless should be reduced by the approximately 
$2,400.00 that is obviously his personal debt and has nothing 
to do with the parties' marriage as well as the $1300.00 
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originally on said card. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT 
IN ITS RULINGS TO THE POINT OF PREJUDICING 
JEANNE AND WRONGFULLY FAVORING PLAINTIFF. 
When looking at the trial court's rulings as a whole, it 
is hard to miss the inconsistencies that abound and have no 
explanation. How can the trial court find that the home was 
paid for with marital funds, as were the contributions to 
Brent Loveless1 retirement and insurance annuity, and yet the 
home is separate property while the retirement and insurance 
annuity are marital property which must be split? How can 
the trial court find that the parties never commingled their 
monies and yet Jeanne, who made a fraction of the money that 
Brent Loveless did, is still responsible for one-half of all 
the debt he incurred, over and above what she has already 
paid herself without his help, and including post-separation 
groceries and Christmas gifts he gave to his family and 
children? 
How can the trial court find that the property values 
should be set as of the time of separation, when the case law 
provided to the court during the Motion in Limine, during the 
trial and in closing argument clearly provides that values be 
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set as of the time of divorce and that opinion as to value at 
any other time not be accepted? How can the trial court 
refuse to grant Jeanne an equitable interest in the marital 
real property when the clear case law provided to the trial 
court at the Motion in Limine, during the trial, during 
closing argument and in the final trial brief provides for 
such a grant? 
Such inconsistencies point to a prejudice of Jeanne in 
this matter or of a wrongful favoring of the Plaintiff to the 
point that the trial court has abused its discretion and its 
judgment of both the facts and law in this matter should be 
substituted by that of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to find that the real 
property owned by Brent Loveless prior to the marriage 
changed character to marital property based upon the payment 
of over $21,000.00 of the mortgage with marital funds, as 
well as Jeanne's other contributions to maintain and enhance 
the property. 
The trial court further erred in fixing the value of 
said property as of the date of separation rather than the 
date of divorce, and for accepting expert testimony valuing 
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the property at the time of separation. 
The trial court further erred by ordering Jeanne to pay 
one-half (1/2) of the debt incurred by Brent Loveless, 
including a $1,300.00 debt he brought into the marriage and 
$2,400.00 incurred after separation for groceries and 
Christmas gifts for his children. 
The serious inconsistencies of trial court indicate a 
prejudice and abuse of discretion which requires the 
Appellate Court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on all issues of fact and law. 
ADDENDUM 
Defendant/Appellant Jeanne Loveless has appended hereto 
copies of the following documents: 
1. Ruling. Dated December 10, 1996. (R. at 331). 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. at 
346) . 
3. Order. (R. at 350). 
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DATED this 11th day of September, 1997. 
JENRTNSvfi HALL I DAY 
Richard L.' Halliday 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 11th day of September, 1997 to the following: 
Brent D. ipung 
P.O. Box 6 
Provo, Uta 
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Fourth jMi^'rl ry-.vct Court 
ofUta-hCoi - . ' ' ^ 
CARMr.L v . .:,C:*;< 
.Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT V. LOVELESS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEANNE M. LOVELESS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 964400123 
DATED: DECEMBER 10, 1996 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented 
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant 
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit 
post-trial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. I now issue this ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I find that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
1. The parties were married March 11, 1994, a second marriage for each. 
2. At the time of the marriage Brent was the custodial parent of his four 
minor children from a prior marriage and Jeanne was the custodial parent for her one 
minor daughter from her prior marriage. 
3. Brent is a school teacher and works his summers at the Pay son City 
0331 
golf course. In the past he has worked in construction. 
4. Prior to the marriage and after his earlier divorce, Brent built a new 
home in which he and his children were living at the time of this marriage. Brent did 
most of the construction himself. 
5. At the time of the marriage the main floor of the home was complete. 
6. Before the marriage Brent had finished two basement bedrooms and he 
had done much of the initial framing of the family room, the basement bathroom and 
one more bedroom. These last three rooms, however, were not completed at the time 
of the marriage. 
7. Before the marriage Brent had landscaped the yards and property. He 
had planted the lawn and trees, created a garden space and installed the deck. The 
only landscaping which he had not completed was the flower beds, which were built 
and planted after the marriage. 
8. In December 1993, only three months prior to the marriage, Brent 
refinanced the home. In order to refinance Brent had the home appraised. The 
appraised value in December 1993 was $98,000. 
9. The refinance loan on the home was in the sum of $69,000, all of which 
was outstanding at the time of the marriage as the first payment on the new loan was 
due in March 1994, the first month of the marriage. 
10. After the marriage the parties agreed to complete the downstairs 
bathroom and the one room to be a bedroom as they needed an additional sleeping 
room. 
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11. Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in completing the 
downstairs rooms. 
12. Essentially all of the materials and supplies used in the completion of 
the downstairs rooms were paid for by Brent although Jeanne paid around $16 for 
blinds for the downstairs rooms and she paid $150 to repair the dishwasher. 
13. Brent performed some of the labor to complete the downstairs rooms 
but hired most out. Jeanne stained the doors and moldings for the new construction, 
installed the blinds and hung wallpaper in the kitchen. 
14. A portion of the funds to complete the downstairs came from a garage 
sale which the parties held after the marriage. 
15. Brent contributed all of the items for the garage sale other than one 
refrigerator which Jeanne contributed. 
16. Jeanne also gave her son a washer, dryer and a water bed which she 
brought to the marriage in exchange for him providing the labor to install the 
bathroom fixtures. 
17. During the marriage Jeanne purchased some flowers for the flower 
gardens of the home. 
18. In June 1995 Jeanne felt the marriage was in trouble and, unknown to 
Brent, she applied for housing assistance and applied for occupancy in an apartment 
complex in Payson. 
19. Because of the tight rental market, no vacancy in the complex existed at 
that time. 
3 
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20. In December 1995 Jeanne separated from Brent and moved into the 
apartment complex. 
21. Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an apartment in June 
1995 and in separating in December 1995, she treated the marriage as over at that 
time. It is appropriate the marriage be treated as over in December 1995. Thus, the 
respective interests of the parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as of 
that date. 
22. During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000 in house payments 
but because such a large share of the payments was applied to interest, in December 
1995 the mortgage had a balance of $64,000. 
23. At the time of the parties separation in December 1995 the home had a 
value of $137,000. At the time of trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser 
fixed the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's appraiser fixed the value at trial at 
$143,000.) 
24. All but $6,600 of the increase in the value of the home is attributable to 
appreciation as the real estate market in Utah County has been particularly strong 
during the time of this marriage. The balance of the increase in the value of the home 
is attributable to the completion of the basement rooms. 
25. While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest in the home, she has 
not demonstrated her right to such an entitlement because: 
a) Brent brought the home into the marriage, 
b) Brent paid for essentially all of the improvements to the 
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basement, 
c) Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home other than the 
routine maintenance which comes with living in the home and 
she purchased and planted some flowers and she stained the 
doors and moldings. In addition Jeanne gave her son a washer, 
dryer and bed in exchange for his labor. 
d) Brent paid the mortgage payments and the utilities on the home 
during the marriage. 
e) Prior to the marriage Jeanne had rent and utility expenses for the 
small home which she rented of approximately $487 per month. 
After the separation she had rent and utility expenses of 
approximately $361 per month. Because her net expense has 
decreased, she cannot claim a need for an interest in the home in 
lieu of alimony. 
£) The parties never commingled their incomes. Brent used his 
income for the family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income 
on her car payment, on some of the family extras such as alcohol 
and Sunday dinners, occasional allowances for the children and 
on family outings. She kept for herself the rest of her funds. 
Because she was able to keep a significant portion of her funds, 
while Brent paid the mortgage payments, Jeanne does not have a 
legitimate claim to a credit for the mortgage payments which 
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Brent made. 
26. At the time of the marriage Jeanne worked at Walmart making $6.20 
per hour. At the time of separation she was earning $7.50 working for Neways. At 
the time of trial she was earning $9.00 per hour. 
27. Brent's income has remained very flat during the marriage. 
28. During the marriage Jeanne used her paycheck to pay her car payment 
and to provide some cash needs of the family, although the majority of the family 
living expenses came from Brent's income. The mortgage payment, utilities and most 
of the food expense came from his income. 
29. During the marriage Brent made contributions to his retirement program 
in the sum of $1,460. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $725. 
30. During the marriage Brent made contributions to a life insurance 
annuity in the sum of $1,600. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or 
$800. 
31. During the marriage the parties acquired a freezer for $375 and a 
camper for $375. These are awarded to Brent but Jeanne is entitled to one-half their 
value, or $375. 
32. During the marriage the parties acquired a boat. It was financed and 
has no equity value over its debt. It is awarded to Brent but he must make the 
payments thereon. 
33. At the time of the marriage Brent had only limited credit card debt and 
he had his home mortgage. During the marriage he incurred additional credit card 
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debt of $3,135. He incurred a debt to Dr. Farley for $741 for a crown for Jeanne's 
tooth not covered by insurance. He incurred a debt to Nebo Credit Union in the sum 
of $800. Each of these are marital obligations. A significant portion of the credit card 
debt was incurred after Jeanne began planning her separation in June 1995 and are 
expenses which Brent would not have incurred had he known of her plan to leave him 
when housing became available. 
34. Brent also incurred a loan to buy a boat and an add-on loan for the boat 
of $804. Because he is keeping the boat, he should be responsible for both of these 
loans. 
35. At the time of the marriage Jeanne had considerable debt, including a 
car loan for her Chevrolet Beretta and debts to Dr. Dewey of $670, to Mountain View 
Hospital of $670, to Bonneville Collection of $900 and to the lawyer from her first 
divorce of $600. All of these were paid from marital funds during the marriage except 
$80 of Dr. Dewey's bill. I assign neither party a benefit nor obligation from these 
marital payments. 
36. Near the end of the marriage Brent borrowed $1,000 from his father and 
$2,000 from his sisters. The loans from the sisters were incurred after the parties 
separated while the loan from his dad was incurred just prior to separation. These 
funds were used on family expenses, although most were used for Brent's family 
expenses post-separation. These are separate debts for which Jeanne is not 
responsible. 
37. Brent advanced $300 to pay for an appraisal which Jeanne wanted of 
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the house. It is appropriate that she reimburse him for this. He also was required on 
a temporary basis to give to Jeanne $500 of his tax refund to her to pay toward her 
attorney's fees. It is appropriate that Jeanne reimburse him for this. 
38. Brent incurred attorney's fees of $14,888.76, which fees are based upon 
counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic matters, this is 
a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred. 
39. Brent asserts he spent a significant amount of fees in this case to protect 
against what he claimed was Jeanne's unwarranted effort to obtain a portion of the 
home equity. 
40. As noted hereafter, Brent has prevailed in his defense of his separate 
ownership of the home. 
41. Because Brent is the sole provider for his three minor children, and 
given the nature of his employment as a school teacher, he does not have the 
capability fully to respond to the attorney's fee bill which he has incurred. 
42. Jeanne has incurred attorney's fees in the sum of $5,688 which fees are 
based upon counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic 
matters, this is a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred. 
43. At the outset of this case Brent was ordered, under a temporary order, 
to pay $500 of his 1996 tax refund to pay toward Jeanne's attorney's fees. He did so. 
44. While Jeanne appears to have the capacity over time to pay her own 
fees, she does not have the capacity to pay Brent's fees. 
45. Brent asserts that he spent a larger amount of fees because Jeanne did 
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not properly respond to outstanding discovery requests and Brent claims he had to 
obtain that information through subpoena from others. In part, at least, he is correct in 
that assertion. 
46. Because I have no specific evidence of how much added expense Brent 
incurred because of Jeanne's failure properly or timely to respond to the discovery, I 
have no factual basis to determine what amount of Brent's fees should be charged to 
Jeanne. 
47. Each party should be required to bear their own attorney's fees. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I now rule as follows: 
Hie home. 
Because the home was Brent's before the marriage, because he paid the 
mortgage payments and utilities and paid the lion's share of the family living expenses, 
because he provided the financing for almost all of the improvement to the home 
during the marriage, and because this was a marriage of short duration (the parties 
married March 1994 and separated December 1995, although Jeanne began her plans 
to separate in June 1995), it is appropriate that Brent retain the house as a separate 
asset. Although it appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a 
separate asset prior to the marriage and Jeanne did little to enhance its value. The 
home should be awarded to Brent free of any claim from Jeanne. 
Other property distributions. 
Brent is awarded the camper and freezer, his retirement and his interest in the 
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life insurance annuity but is obligated to reimburse Jeanne for half of each as follows: 
Camper $ 375 
Freezer $ 375 
retirement $1,450 
life insurance $1.600 
Total $3,800/2 = $1,900 
Brent also is awarded the boat and the debt thereon as the boat has no equity. 
Debts. 
Brent is assigned to pay the following marital debts but Jeanne is responsible 
to reimburse him for one-half thereof: 
Visa $ 604 
Mastercard $2,531 
Dr. Farley $ 791 
Nebo Credit Union $ 800 
Total $4,726 / 2 = $2,363. 
Post separation Brent has paid the following marital obligations for which he is 
entitled to a reimbursement from Jeanne of one-half: 
Shaffer & Assoc. $ 109 
Columbia House $ 77 
Total $ 186 /2 = $93, 
I award Brent no claim against Jeanne for the loans which he borrowed from 
his father and sisters at or near the time of the separation or the boat add-on loan nor 
do I award him any claim against Jeanne for her debts paid during the marriage as 
those were marital payments. 
Summary of financial adjustments. 
Jeanne is entitled to payment of $1,900 from Brent for her interest in personal 
property, retirement and life insurance. Brent is entitled to payment from Jeaime for 
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one-half of the marital debt of $2,363 and one-half of the marital debt paid by Brent 
post-separation in the sum of $93. Further, pursuant to a temporary order of the Court 
Brent paid $500 of Jeanne's attorney's fees and $300 for her appraisal of the home. 
She bears responsibility for each of these and must repay Brent for them. The 
summary of all of these payments is as follows. 
Brent owes Jeanne: $1,900 
Jeanne owes Brent: $2,363 
$ 93 
$ 500 
$ 300 
Total $3,256. 
When these are offset Jeanne owes Brent $1,356. 
Attorney's fees. 
Each party incurred significant attorney's fees. Brent particularly wants an 
award of fees as he felt that Jeanne needlessly caused him to incur significant fees in 
defending his claim to the home. In fact, however, each party has the ability to pay 
their own attorney's fees and neither has the ability to pay the other's fees. Each 
should be ordered to bear their own fees and costs in this matter. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Brent's counsel 
is directed to prepare proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and an amended 
decree of divorce, consistent with this ruling but augmented as appropriate. 
Dated this W_ day of December, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY^ W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this / U day of December, 1996: 
RICHARD L HALLIDAY ATTY 
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BRENT D YOUNG ATTY 
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CARMA B. SMITH 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT V. LOVELESS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(TRIAL DATE SEPTEMBER 3, 18, 
1996) 
Civil No. 96440123 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
JEANNE M. LOVELESS, 
Defendant. 
Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented 
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant 
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit post-
trial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. The court now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
1 . The parties were married March 11, 1994, a second marriage for each. 
2. At the time of the marriage Brent was the custodial parent of his four minor 
children from a prior marriage and Jeanne was the custodial parent for her one minor 
daughter from her prior marriage. 
3. Brent is a school teacher and works his summers at the Pay son City golf 
course. In the past he has worked in construction. 
4. Prior to the marriage and after his earlier divorce, Brent built a new home in 
which he and his children were living at the time of this marriage. Brent did most of the 
construction himself 
5. At the time of the marriage the main floor of the home was complete. 
6. Before the marriage Brent had finished two basement bedrooms and he had 
done much of the initial framing of the family room, the basement bathroom and one 
more bedroom. These last three rooms, however, were not completed at the time of the 
marriage. 
7. Before the marriage Brent had landscaped the yards and property. He had 
planted the lawn and trees, created a garden space and installed the deck. The only 
landscaping which he had not completed was the flower beds, which were built and 
planted after the marriage. 
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8. In December 1993, only three months prior to the marriage, Brent 
refinanced the home. In order to refinance Brent had the home appraised. The appraised 
value in December 1993 was $98,000. 
9. The refinance loan on the home was in the sum of $69,000, all of which 
was outstanding at the time of the marriage as the first payment on the new loan was due 
in March 1994, the first month of the marriage. 
10. After the marriage the parties agreed to complete the downstairs bathroom 
and the one room to be a bedroom as they needed an additional sleeping room. 
11. Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in completing the downstairs 
rooms. 
12. Essentially all of the materials and supplies used in the completion of the 
downstairs rooms were paid for by Brent although Jeanne paid around $16 for blinds for 
the downstairs rooms and she paid $150 to repair the dishwasher. 
13. Brent performed some of the labor to complete the downstairs rooms but 
hired most out. Jeanne stained the doors and moldings for the new construction, installed 
the blinds and hung wallpaper in the kitchen. 
14. A portion of the funds to complete the downstairs came from a garage sale 
which the parties held after the marriage. 
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15. Brent contributed all of the items for the garage sale other than one 
refrigerator which Jeanne contributed. 
16. Jeanne also gave her son a washer, dryer and a water bed which she brought 
to the marriage in exchange for him providing the labor to install the bathroom fixtures. 
17. During the marriage Jeanne purchased some flowers for the flower gardens 
of the home. 
18. In June 1995 Jeanne felt the marriage was in trouble and, unknown to 
Brent, she applied for housing assistance and applied for occupancy in an apartment 
complex in Payson. 
19. Because of the tight rental market, no vacancy in the complex existed at that 
time. 
20. In December 1995 Jeanne separated from Brent and moved into the 
apartment complex. 
21. Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an apartment in June 1995 
and in separating in December 1995, she treated the marriage as over at that time. It is 
appropriate the marriage be treated as over in December 1995. Thus, the respective 
interests of the parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as of that date. 
22. During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000 in house payments but 
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because such a large share of the payments was applied to interest, in December 1995 the 
mortgage had a balance of $64,000. 
23. At the time of the parties separation in December 1995 the home had a 
value of $137,000. At the time of trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser fixed 
the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's appraiser fixed the value at trial at $143,000.) 
24. All but $6,600 of the increase in the value of the home is attributable to 
appreciation as the real estate market in Utah County has been particularly strong during 
the time of this marriage. The balance of the increase in the value of the home is 
attributable to the completion of the basement rooms. 
25. While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest in the home, she has not 
demonstrated her right to such an entitlement because: 
a) Brent brought the home into the marriage, 
b) Brent paid for essentially all of the improvements to the basement, 
c) Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home other than the routine 
maintenance which comes with living in the home and she purchased and 
planted some flowers and she stained the doors and moldings. In addition 
Jeanne gave her son a washer, dryer and bed in exchange for his labor. 
d) Brent paid the mortgage payments and the utilities on the home during the 
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marriage. 
e) Prior to the marriage Jeanne had rent and utility expenses for the small 
home which she rented of approximately $487 per month. After the 
separation she had rent and utility expenses of approximately $361 per 
month. Because her net expense has decreased, she cannot claim a need for 
an interest in the home in lieu of alimony. 
f) The parties never commingled their incomes. Brent used his income for the 
family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income on her car payment, on 
some of the family extras such as alcohol and Sunday dinners, occasional 
allowances for the children and on family outings. She kept for herself the 
rest of her funds. Because she was able to keep a significant portion of her 
funds, while Brent paid the mortgage payments, Jeanne does not have a 
legitimate claim to a credit for the mortgage payments which Brent made. 
26. At the time of the marriage Jeanne worked at Wahnart making $6.20 per 
hour. At the time of separation she was earning $7.50 working for Neways. At the time 
of trial she was earning $9.00 per hour. 
27. Brent's income has remained very flat during the marriage. 
28. During the marriage Jeanne used her paycheck to pay her car payment and 
6 
to provide some cash needs of the family, although the majority of the family living 
expenses came from Brent's income. The mortgage payment, utilities and most of the 
food expense came from his income, 
29. During the marriage Brent made contributions to his retirement program in 
the sum of $1,460. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $725. 
30. During the marriage Brent made contributions to a life insurance annuity in 
the sum of $1,600. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $800. 
31. During the marriage the parties acquired a freezer for $375 and a camper 
for $375. These are awarded to Brent but Jeanne is entitled to one-half their value, or 
$375. 
32. During the marriage the parties acquired a boat. It was financed and has no 
equity value over its debt. It is awarded to Brent but he must make the payments thereon. 
33. At the time of the marriage Brent had only limited credit card debt and 
he had his home mortgage. During the marriage he incurred additional credit card debt of 
$3,135. He incurred a debt to Dr. Farley for $741 for a crown for Jeanne's tooth not 
covered by insurance. He incurred a debt to Nebo Credit Union in the sum of $800. Each 
of these are marital obligations. A significant portion of the credit card debt was incurred 
after Jeanne began planning her separation in June 1995 and are expenses which Brent 
7 
would not have incurred had he known of her plan to leave him when housing became 
available. 
34. Brent also incurred a loan to buy a boat and an add-on loan for the boat of 
$804. Because he is keeping the boat, he should be responsible for both of these loans. 
35. At the time of the marriage Jeanne had considerable debt, including a car 
loan for her Chevrolet Beretta and debts to Dr. Dewey of $670, to Mountain View 
Hospital of $670, to Bonneville Collection of $900 and to the lawyer from her first 
divorce of $600. All of these were paid from marital funds during the marriage except 
$80 of Dr. Dewey's bill. I assign neither party a benefit nor obligation from these marital 
payments. 
36. Near the end of the marriage Brent borrowed $1,000 from his father and 
$2,000 from his sisters. The loans from the sisters were incurred after the parties 
separated while the loan from his dad was incurred just prior to separation. These funds 
were used on family expenses, although most were used for Brent's family expenses post 
separation. These are separate debts for which Jeanne is not responsible. 
37. Brent advanced $300 to pay for an appraisal which Jeanne wanted of the 
house. It is appropriate that she reimburse him for this. He also was required on a 
temporary basis to give to Jeanne $500 of his tax refund to her to pay toward her 
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attorney's fees. It is appropriate that Jeanne reimburse him for this. 
38. Brent incurred attorney's fees of $14,888.76, which fees are based upon 
counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic matters, this is a 
reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred. 
39. Brent asserts he spent a significant amount of fees in this case to protect 
against what he claimed was Jeanne's unwarranted effort to obtain a portion of the home 
equity. 
40. As noted hereafter, Brent has prevailed in his defense of his separate 
ownership of the home. 
41. Because Brent is the sole provider for his three minor children, and given 
the nature of his employment as a school teacher, he does not have the capability fully to 
respond to the attorney's fee bill which he has incurred. 
42. Jeanne has incurred attorney's fees in the sum of $5,688 which fees are 
based upon counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic 
matters, this is a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred. 
43. At the outset of this case Brent was ordered, under a temporary order, to 
pay $500 of his 1996 tax refund to pay toward Jeanne's attorney's fees. He did so. 
44. While Jeanne appears to have the capacity over time to pay her own fees, 
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she does not have the capacity to pay Brent's fees. 
45. Brent asserts that he spent a larger amount of fees because Jeanne did not 
properly respond to outstanding discovery requests and Brent claims he had to obtain that 
information through subpoena from others. In part, at least, he is correct in that assertion. 
46. Because I have no specific evidence of how much added expense Brent 
incurred because of Jeanne's failure properly or timely to respond to the discovery, I have 
no factual basis to determine what amount of Brent's fees should be charged to Jeanne. 
47. Each party should be required to bear their own attorney's fees. 
48. Defendant shall be restored her former name of McNeil. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) That Mr. Loveless is entitled to be awarded the house as a separate asset, free 
of any claim from Jeanne; 
(2) That the parties are entitled to a distribution of their personal property; 
retirement and life insurance annuity; 
(3) The parties are entitled to an allocation of their marital debts; 
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(4) That each party should pay his or her own attorney fees and costs; 
(5) That defendant is entitled to be restored her former name of McNeil. 
RICHARD L. HALLIDAY 
Attorney for Defendant, Jeanne M. Loveless 
H \COMMON\HEATHER\LVLSS FOF 
11 
iv-V FILED 2-' 
BRENT D.YOUNG '•''U » « 3 « f f l ^ Clerk 
IVIE & YOUNG <~ ' ' W ^ ^ T 1 9 'Deputy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff - - -7-7 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT V. LOVELESS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ORDER 
(TRIAL DATE SEPTEMBER 3, 18, 
1996) 
Civil No. 96440H23 
Judge Anthony W. SchofielcL 
JEANNE M. LOVELESS, 
Defendant. 
Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented 
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant 
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit post-
trial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. Based on the accompanying 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The home. Brent is awarded the house as a separate asset. Although it 
appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a separate asset prior to 
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the marriage and Jeanne did little to enhance its value. The home is awarded to Brent free 
of any claim from Jeanne. 
2. Other property distributions. Brent is awarded the camper and freezer, his 
retirement and his interest in the life insurance annuity but is obligated to reimburse 
Jeanne for half of each as follows: 
Camper $375 
Freezer $ 375 
retirement $1,450 
life insurance $1,600 
Total $3,800/2 = $1,900 
Brent also is awarded the boat and the debt thereon as the boat has no equity. 
3. Debts. Brent is assigned to pay the following marital debts but Jeanne is 
responsible to reimburse him for one-half thereof: 
Visa $ 604 
Mastercard $2,531 
Dr. Farley $791 
Nebo Credit Union $ 800 
Total $4,726 / 2 = $2,363 
Post separation Brent has paid the following marital obligations for which he is 
entitled to a reimbursement from Jeanne of one-half: 
Shaffer & Assoc. $ 109 
Columbia House $ 77 
Total $ 186 / 2 = $93. 
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4. The court awards Brent no claim against Jeanne for the loans which he 
borrowed from his father and sisters at or near the time of the separation or the boat add-
on loan nor is he awarded any claim against Jeanne for her debts paid during the marriage 
as those were marital payments. 
5. Summary of financial adjustments. Jeanne is entitled to payment of $1,900 
from Brent for her interest in personal property, retirement and life insurance. Brent is 
entitled to payment from Jeanne for one-half of the marital debt of $2,363 and one-half 
of the marital debt paid by Brent post-separation in the sum of $93. Further, pursuant to a 
temporary order of the Court Brent paid $500 of Jeanne's attorney's fees and $300 for her 
appraisal of the home. She bears responsibility for each of these and must repay Brent for 
them. The summary of all of these payments is as follows. 
Brent owes Jeanne: $ 1,900 
Jeanne owes Brent: $2,363 
$93 
$500 
$300 
Total $3,256 
When these are offset Jeanne owes Brent $1,356. 
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6. Attorney's fees. Each party will bear their own fees and costs in this matter. 
7. Defendant is restored her former name of McNeil. 
Dated this _Tj_ day of RPn/tt^/ , 1997. J&O&iv. rSF&&&* J<Wd 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY W. S 
RICHARD L. HALLIDAY 
Attorney for Defendant, Jeanne Loveless 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Findings 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, on the 13th day of January. 1997: 
Richard L Halliday 
Attorney at Law 
2002 East 11500 South 
Sandy, UT 84092 
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